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Several European countries, facing a sizeable underground economy, often adopt underground reducing policies mainly 
based on incentives in the tax-benefit system. Since empirical evidence manifests a substantial failure of such policies, 
we construct a simple model to indicate the crucial aspects of this failure. To this end we consider a tax-evading firm, 
allocating work in the official and underground sector, where it is not taxed. With a view to reducing underground 
employment, the government may decide to launch an amnesty for past social security non-compliance, whilst 
providing fiscal incentives for new hiring in order to encourage a process of worker regularization. Allowing for 
endogenous enforcement, we find that the reputation of policy makers in combating tax evasion proves crucial in 
determining the success of such a policy.  
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  11. Introduction
1
The aim of this paper is to show the shortcomings of regularization policies targeting underground 
employment. In this respect we stress the role of the audit probability as an endogenous variable 
influenced by the efficiency/reputation of the Fiscal Authority.  
Recently the European Commission focused attention on underground employment, suggesting that 
all member States adopt a common strategy against "undeclared work". Since 2001, among the 
Guidelines for employment policies in Member States, that on "undeclared work" has been 
systematically reiterated. The Council resolution on transforming undeclared work into regular 
Employment (2003/C 260/01) suggested: i) simplification of the business environment; ii) the 
removal of disincentives and the provision of appropriate incentives in the tax and benefits system; 
iii) improvement in enforcement.
2   
Our analysis will concentrate on the efficiency of policies pertaining to point ii), using the Italian 
experience of regularization policies as reference. In the European Union, Italy is one of the 
countries with the largest size of underground employment.
3 In the 1980s and 1990s Italian 
governments introduced several legislative and administrative measures aiming to contrast it. In a 
first stage the strategy was to support a process of regularization.
4 In recent years a different 
                                                 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the Italian Ministry of University for the funding provided (PRIN 2006). We 
thank participants at the seminar held at the University of Bath (UK) for useful comments. Usual disclaimers apply. 
2 See also the Council Decision 2005/600/EC of 12 July 2005 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member 
States, Guideline No. 21. Strategies against informal economy have been investigated by Tenguez and Klump (2005). 
3 The National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) provides a time series estimate of underground employment covering the 
period 1980-2004 for the country as a whole, rising from 11 to 16% of total subordinate employment. The ISTAT 
method of estimating the size of underground employment (labour input method) is well described in OECD (2002). 
4 For instance, realignment contracts, fiscal deduction to firms involved in a regularization process; national, regional 
and provincial committees established to deal with underground employment. See the website of the committee for the 
“emersion” of non-regular employment: http://www.emersionelavorononregolare.it/. 
  2approach has been implemented, mainly focused on improving enforcement, as stated in the 
financial law of 2007. 
In this paper we perform a comparative static analysis to disentangle the effect of the regularization 
policy, which is basically modelled as a device to launder former underground labour relationship 
(such as in Italy with Law 383/2001).
5 With a simple model, which includes the main 
characteristics of the policy measures set up to reduce shadow employment, we show that their 
effects may be weak or even perverse. The government offers two incentives to firms shifting 
labour from underground to official production: a) a settlement for past social security non-
compliance; b) a tax cut for the amount of regularized workers. The implicit assumption in our 
analysis is that tax authorities are unable to ascertain whether the amount of regular employment 
declared after the settlement is also the full employment engaged in the production process.  
One important innovation in our paper is the inclusion of an endogenous probability of being 
controlled.
6 Enforcement is modelled as a function of regular firm size, taking into account the 
credibility/efficiency of the Fiscal Authority. The latter issue is crucial in the literature on tax 
amnesties: depending on the structure of the amnesty program and on the perceived likelihood of 
repetition, such amnesties can be a tough blow to government credibility, causing perverse effects.
7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the profit maximization problem in the 
presence of tax evasion and endogenous enforcement; Section 3 describes the effects of the 
regularization policy, using calibration techniques; finally, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
5 We borrow this definition from Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1996), who study the effects of amnesty in the presence 
of black asset stocks. 
6 The issue of enforcement has a major role in explaining tax evasion. In the basic model of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) the enforcement policy is reduced to two exogenous parameters, whereas there are more sophisticated 
combinations of them explored in the literature (Franzoni, 1998). Amongst others, Engels and Hines (1999) investigate 
the dynamics of tax evasion when retrospective enforcement occurs; Snow and Warren (2005) deal with the effect of 
audit effectiveness on compliance. 
7 See amongst others, Leonard and Zeckhauser, 1987; Bordignon, 2002; Franzoni, 1996; 2000. 
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2. The model 
Our firm produces a good Y with a three-input Cobb Douglas technology: 
() () () ( ) 1 ; 0 ,
1
, , < + > =






t R t ,     (1) 
where K is the total capital stock, LR and LU are the regular and underground labour inputs, a and b 
are input elasticities and t refers to time. Since we focus on regularization policies targeting 
underground employment, we write the technology in intensive form, expressing output and labour 
per capital unit: 




t R t     (2). 
In addition, to simplify the analysis, we also assume that the non-labour input is normalized to one 
and population growth is set to zero; this allows us to consider the size of the firm which operates in 
this context as exclusively related to the labour input. Moreover, we fix total employment size: 
1 , , = = + l l l t U t R   t ∀      (3) 
so that the shift of labour from underground to regular production reads as follows: 
 
t U t R l l , , Δ − = Δ        ( 4 )  
 
When hiring regular workers, firms face a tax rate, τ, on net wage w, whereas by employing workers 
irregularly, firms only pay w. However, in this latter situation the firm faces an audit rate, ρ, and a 
fine, here expressed as a surcharge of the statutory tax rate, s.
8 Hence, under tax evasion the cost of 
labour is: 
                                                 
8 Corner solutions are excluded by the technology characteristics, since marginal productivity of each input goes to 
infinity as long as its utilization tends to zero. The following restrictions on enforcement parameters are imposed: i) 
s>1; ii) ρ<(1/s). These imply no income effect of enforcement policy and no corner solutions for regular/irregular labor 
[for details see Yitzhaki (1974)]. 
  4 
Detected  Probability  (ρ)  w(1+ τ)lR,t + w(1+ τ s)lU,t  
Not Detected    Probability (1-ρ)  w(1+ τ)lR,t + wlU,t
 
In our simplified framework, the parameter ρ summarizes three different aspects, that we assume to 
be coincident: the audit rate, the probability of being detected once audited, the probability of 
paying the fine once detected. In practice they are not concurrent: for instance, though audited and 
fined, the effective payment may be delayed and also reduced after a court process; there may be 
competing jurisdictions that may cause delay in the fine application, and so on. All of these may 
weaken the Fiscal Authority’s efficiency, reducing enforcement power. We account for these 
features by allowing enforcement, ρ, to be an inverse function of the Fiscal Authority’s inefficiency, 
m, which summarizes several aspects, such as the scarce coordination among its departments 
(Revenue Agency, Customs, Tax Police, Social Security Institutions); the low level of information 
technology and consequent low productivity; the limits to the power of investigation of the tax 
police and so on. 
In addition, the probability of detection may also be affected by the size of non-compliance, 
especially when tax evasion refers to social security, since the larger the number of irregular 
workers, the higher the risk of being reported. Our innovation consists in allowing the enforcement 
parameter ρ to be endogenous, since it depends inversely on the share of regular labour, lR.  












, ρ ; (5) 
with the inefficiency of fiscal authorities increasing in m, a parameter ranging between 0 and 1. 
Thus, the probability of being fined is directly related to the share of irregularity. However, the 
inefficiency parameter m acts as a discounting factor: as long as inefficiency rises, the probability of 
  5detecting tax evasion is scaled down, and eventually, i.e. for the largest inefficiency m=1, halved. 
Notice that the explicit form in the (5) implies that 
R l , ρ ε , i.e. the elasticity of the probability of being 
audited to the size of regular employment, is a decreasing and convex function of the regular labour 
input. Therefore, the more regular a firm is, the more a marginal increase in regular employment 
will lower the risk of being audited. 
The behaviour of the endogenous probability is displayed in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 
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Profit maximization determines the demand schedules of regular (and irregular) work on the basis 
of all parameters describing technology, tax policy, enforcement, and fiscal authority efficiency. 
The basic assumption in our formalization is that firms have no expectations about future 
regularization policies, so that the maximizing problem is akin to a static environment. 
 
3. Effects of underground reducing policies 
Given the optimization framework set up in the previous section, it is possible to investigate the 
effect of a regularization policy promoted by the government. To this end we made the following 
assumption. First, firms participating in the regularization policy are offered an amnesty fee that is 
proportional to the size of regularized workers, and they are granted immunity from legal 
prosecution for self-reported past non-compliance. Second, the government promotes the 
“emersion” of underground employment, offering a perpetual tax cut for regularized workers. 
  6Third, the measures adopted are followed by declarations of fiscal authority of increasing strictness 
of enforcement.
9
Once a regularization policy is offered, the firm evaluates both whether and how far to participate 
in the policy. In this sense, the optimal share of regular labour chosen at time t,  is a starting point 
from which the moonlighter might move after the policy, achieving  . It should be noted that 
amnesties intrinsically imply a dynamic framework, since they refer to past non-compliance, and 
involve also decisions about future revenues. However, our analysis differs from the standard 
framework of the tax amnesty since we also allow for a tax deduction aiming to reduce underground 




1 , + t R l
10 Since we are mainly interested in the long-run 
effects of the regularization policy, we adopt a comparative static analysis to investigate the steady 
state properties without and with the regularization policy. This, of course, prevents us from 
examining the dynamics of adjustment, and expectation-related issues, that are not the main focus 
of the present paper, but a matter for future research. 
The decision to participate in the regularization process depends upon two crucial parameters: the 
credibility of a stricter enforcement, which would affect the level of the efficiency parameter m; the 
opportunity cost to adjust regular labour from the previous optimal steady state to the new one. 
After the policy, the firm faces a new profit function: 
() () () () () () () 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1
:




t R t l w wl m l l s w m l l w l l
Max
α ρ τ ρ τ π
   (7) 
where   indicates the variation in regular employment subsequent to the policy, i.e. the 
difference between the “with” and “without” policy steady states, and  
1 , + Δ t R l
() ( ) τ γ β α α + + − = 1 0             ( 8 )  
                                                 
9 For details on the economics and laws on amnesty policy in Italian experience see Bernasconi and Lapecorella (2007). 
On the theoretical implication of amnesties see references on Franzoni (2000). 
10 The empirical evidence for Italy shows that incentives to firms have been reiterated for decades, using different 
forms, and they have often been targeted to support employment. 
  7summarizes the benefits and costs that firms assess in order to decide whether or not to adhere to 
regularization. This decision is based on the size of fiscal incentive ( 0 α ) but also on the size of the 
amnesty fee (β) and on the adjustment costs (γ) on regular labour.
11  
The new optimal solution is the one that solves the following non-linear (on regular labour) 
equation, where endogenous enforcement is explicitly modelled: 
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In Equation (9) the left hand side (LHS) shows the positive impact of a marginal change in regular 
employment on profits, whereas the right hand side (RHS) displays the negative marginal effect. 
From equation (9) we get partial derivatives, whose sign is summarized in Table 1, showing that 
regular employment is positively affected by fiscal allowances, but also by stricter enforcement. 
Conversely, the greater the inefficiency of fiscal authority, the lower the effect of the regularisation 
policy is. Finally, the size of adjustment costs and adhesion cost also impacts on the steady state of 
regular employment, lowering the effect of the regularization policy. 
 




adhesion fee (β) 






Sign of the first 
derivative 
- -  +  -  + 
 
To further specify the solution of the FOC displayed in Eq. 9 it is necessary to take into account the 
following constraint: 
                                                 
11 The adjustment costs are consequent to our assumption of a different productivity of the two labour inputs. In fact, 
regularization implies an additional investment in human capital to raise the productivity of underground employees, 
i.e. a>b, which can be accounted for by training activities. 
  80 , ≥ Δ t R l α .      (10) 
This indicates that when the net incentive is binding (i.e. positive), we expect the firm to increase 
the size of its regular employment, whereas under a negative incentive no adjustment of the labour 
allocation occurs. 
We can describe the firm’s optimal profile of regularization process in two simultaneous steps. 
First, the firm evaluates the credibility of stricter enforcement, reformulating the value of the 
enforcement efficiency m. Second, it observes the value of the incentive to regularization, 
comparing it with the adhesion and adjustment costs.  
Under these assumptions, we can distinguish the following two cases of interest.
12
 
Case 1) mt=mt+1 (no change in the efficiency parameter) 
 
In this case the regularization policy does not change the firm’s belief on fiscal authority efficiency. 
We must distinguish between: 
1A)  0 > α  
In this situation   and the intensity of regularization will depend on two competing forces: 
the size of the monetary benefit provided by the policy; the minor risk of auditing consequent to the 
regularization. As specified above, given the functional form chosen for the endogenous audit rate, 
the higher the proportion of regularity, the stronger is the latter effect. Therefore, for a given 
monetary incentive, the effectiveness of the regularization policy is more intense in a context with 




1 , t R t R l l > +
1B)  0 ≤ α  
                                                 
12 We omit the case of decreasing levels of inefficiency following a declaration of amnesty since its consequence on 
regularity can be easily obtained by reading case 2 in the opposite direction.  
  9In this circumstance no regularization process occurs, since the incentives for hiring are completely 




1 , t R t R l l = +
 
Case 2) mt<mt+1 (a worsening of the efficiency parameter) 
 
This situation can occur when the credibility of the government commitment to combat 
underground practices is very weak. In this case the regularization policy produces a side-effect, 
that is to worsen the firm’s belief in fiscal authority efficiency. As in the previous case we must 
distinguish between two situations: 
2A)  0 > α  
Given the constraint in Eq. 10, we again find  . However, with reference to the case 1A) 
we observe a further effect impeding the subsidy for regularization which is the inefficiency effect. 
Therefore, for a given net monetary allowance, we expect to find a steady state solution for regular 




1 , t R t R l l ≥ +
2B)  0 ≤ α  
This is the worse situation for the effectiveness of the policy. Not only is the subsidising policy not 
binding, but the government announcement to commit to stricter enforcement is not credible. Under 
these circumstances we have two contrasting forces. On the one hand, the inefficiency parameter 
pushes toward a reduction in regularity. On the other hand, this perverse effect is counterbalanced 
by: i) endogenous enforcement; ii) adjustment costs. The net effect will depend on the relative 
elasticity of probability to the regular employment share and the inefficiency parameter. As 
discussed above, given the audit function, we may predict that a reduction in the regularity share is 
more likely for firms with high underground employment.  
  
  10In the next subsections we simulate the effects of the policy using calibration techniques to solve 
our model, since the FOC are non-linear. 
 
3.1 Calibration 
Our model is calibrated on the Italian economy, as shown in Table 2, but it can be generalized to 
many European countries with a sizeable underground sector.  
Table 2: parameter calibration 
a b w  τ s m  γ  α0 - β 
0.4 0.1 0.5 0.27  1.3 0.25  0.05  0.20 
 
The tax and penalty rates (τ, s) are set respectively to 0.27 and 1.3 according to fiscal and 
enforcement law evidence.  
As to the size of the adjustment cost, we had no precise estimate for Italy, but we relied on 
estimates for France, a country with quite a similar degree of rigidity of the labour market to Italy.
13 
The net size of the fiscal policy to support regularization (α0, - β) is fixed at a benchmark of 20% to 
catch the main features of Law 383/2001. The others values were selected to reach a steady state 




3.2 Policy simulation 
                                                 
13 Abowd and Kramartz (2003) showed, utilizing a data set for French industry, that the costs of hiring (including the 
training costs) are only about 5% of the annual labour cost, whereas firing costs represent 56%. In general, in countries 
with strong employment protection, such as many European countries, the costs of separation are considerably larger 
than those of recruitment. 
14 ISTAT (2005), Schneider and Enste (2000). For details on parameter calibration see also Busato and Chiarini (2004). 
  11Now we can compare the steady state solutions of regular employment with and without the 
regularization policy, distinguishing the different cases described in the previous section. In the 
Figures below, we plot on the horizontal axes the size of regular employment and on the vertical 
axes the two curves LHS and RHS derived from Eq. 9, respectively the positive and negative 
impact on profits due to a marginal change in regular employment. The steady state solution is at 
the intersection of the two curves.  
Fig. 2  
Figure 2 depicts the regular labour input steady state solution before (solid lines) and after the 
policy (dashed lines) in case 1A. We set the adhesion cost at 0.02 in order to make it beneficial for 
firms to adhere (i.e. α>0). The steady state level for regular employment moves from   
(point X) to   (point Y). The after-policy steady state stresses the effectiveness of the 
incentive to regularization: the reduction in the tax burden for regularised workers, along with the 
adjustment costs, modify both sides of Eq. (9). If α<0, that is case 1B, no variation will occur in the 
steady state level (fixed at point X). 
7743 . 0
*
, ≅ t R l
7928 . 0
*
1 , ≅ + t R l
Case 2 discloses the role of the fiscal authority’s credibility. When the commitment to strict 
enforcement is not considered consistent with a regularization policy, firms will translate it into an 
increase in the level of enforcement inefficiency. We raise the inefficiency parameter m from 0.25 
to 0.50. As for case 1, we first consider case 2A in which α>0. It is visualized in figure 3 below. 
Fig. 3 
Figure 3 shows that the increase in the inefficiency parameter from 0.25 to 0.50 counteracts the 
effectiveness of the regularization policy. The new steady state of regular employment is now at 
, at point W. 7897 . 0
*
1 , = + t R l
15 This value is above the pre-policy solution (point X) but below the 
post-policy solution (point Y) obtained under case 1A. Finally, the worst outcome of the 
                                                 
15 A sensitivity analysis for a set of these parameters confirms the robustness of these results, and is available upon 
request. 
  12regularization policy, case 2B, is registered when the benefits from the reduction of irregular labor 
are lower than the adhesion fee and the adjustment cost burden (α<0). In such a situation, the fiscal 
incentive and the amnesty fee do not influence the post-policy steady state, while the firm chooses 
the optimal size of regular employment taking into account: i) the lower enforcement due to the 
increase in m;  ii) the cost of adjusting regular employment. Under our calibration, the lower 
credibility of fiscal authorities (m = 0.25) associated to the small incentive to regularization produce 
a new steady state level of regularity at   (point Z in Figure 4).  7608 . 0
*




In this paper we analysed and simulated the effect of underground reducing policies based on 
incentives to regularization. This policy approach has been frequently adopted in Italy, for instance 
with Law 383/2001, but without success. The model and simulation exercise help to explain the 
poor results of the policies adopted in Italy in recent decades. There are at least three major reasons 
that account for the shortfalls of this approach: the low level of incentives compared to the costs of 
adhering to amnesty, the high level of labour adjustment costs and, finally, the effect on the firm's 
efficiency assessment of the fiscal authority. 
This analysis supports the change in the approach, pivoting on controls and enforcement, adopted 
by Italian fiscal authorities in combating underground employment. Of course, the previous policy 
approach, mainly based on tax deduction, was supported by different motivations, among which the 
contribution of the underground economy to income certainly played a major role. 
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